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ABSTRACT—While thirty-two states in the United States still authorize 
capital punishment, this country finds itself in the midst of an undisputed 
trend towards states outlawing the death penalty. Over the past six years, 
legislatures in six states have abolished capital punishment—breaking a 
three-decade-long death penalty reform stalemate. Although anti-death 
penalty advocates have fought to abolish capital punishment in the United 
States for over two centuries, their successes were fairly minimal until 
recently. What accounts for the anti-death penalty movement’s recent 
success? This Note argues that “interest-convergence,” a theory developed 
by Professor Derrick Bell, provides one important explanation. Within the 
past decade, anti-death penalty advocates have placed less emphasis on the 
moral arguments against capital punishment, focusing more on the costs 
and inefficiencies of the practice. In turn, state legislatures have been 
receptive to the anti-death penalty movement’s cost arguments, especially 
in light of the recent economic crisis. In other words, by giving state 
legislatures a self-interested reason to abolish capital punishment—saving 
their constituents millions of dollars (and increasing their chances of 
reelection)—anti-death penalty advocates have aligned state lawmakers’ 
interests with their own. The result has been an apparent turning point for 
death penalty reform in America.   
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While thirty-two states in the United States still authorize capital 
punishment, this country finds itself in the midst of an undisputed trend 
towards states outlawing the death penalty.1 When New Jersey’s legislature 
repealed the state’s capital punishment statute in 2007, it became the first 
state legislature to abolish the death penalty since 1976.2 Over the past six 
years, five other state legislatures have followed suit.3 Although anti-death 
penalty advocates have fought to abolish capital punishment in the United 
States for over two centuries, their successes were fairly minimal until 
recently. What accounts for the anti-death penalty movement’s recent 
 
1 See Valerie Richardson, States Slowly Killing Capital Punishment, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, 
at A01 (“The death penalty, already on the decline across the United States, could face its own demise 
at the hands of several state legislatures next year.”); States With and Without the Death Penalty, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (DPIC), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-
penalty (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); The Death Penalty: Another Reprieve, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2012, 
at 44 (describing Connecticut’s repeal of capital punishment as “part of a growing trend”); US: 
Momentum Against the Death Penalty, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2012/04/12/us-momentum-against-death-penalty (stating that “the momentum against the death 
penalty [in the United States] is gaining force”). 
2 Robert J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The First State in Modern History to 
Repeal Its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 485 (2010). 
3 Since 2007, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and Maryland have 
abolished the death penalty. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 1. 
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success? This Note attempts to provide an answer to this question and 
concludes that one partial explanation is a straightforward one: interest-
convergence. 
For decades, the anti-death penalty movement suffered from “too few 
members, too little money, and too little broad appeal in the messages the 
movement has tried to deliver.”4 Over the past twenty years, however, the 
anti-death penalty movement’s strategy has shifted away from fighting the 
death penalty solely on moral grounds. Although anti-death penalty 
advocates continue to argue that the death penalty is morally wrong, within 
the past decade advocacy organizations have increasingly advanced 
economic rationales for opposing death sentences. Specifically, they argue 
that because capital punishment is irrationally expensive and ineffective, it 
wastes money and steals resources from other state needs. In other words, 
the opportunity costs of the death penalty are too great. 
In turn, state legislatures, still coming to grips with the wake of the 
recent financial crisis, have proved receptive to the anti-death penalty 
movement’s cost arguments. In statements supporting the abolition of the 
death penalty, many state lawmakers have pointed to the high costs of 
capital punishment.5 In fact, it has been recognized that cost was an 
important factor behind the legislatures’ decisions to abolish the death 
penalty in New Jersey and New Mexico.6 
As this Note illustrates, in addition to New Jersey and New Mexico, 
cost played a major role in the abolition of capital punishment in Illinois, 
Connecticut, and Maryland. Cost has also influenced lawmakers in several 
other states to introduce death penalty repeal bills that eliminate capital 
punishment as a sentencing possibility. More importantly, however, this 
Note argues that the success of the cost argument did not occur entirely by 
happenstance, as others have suggested.7 Rather, its success resulted from a 
deliberate effort by anti-death penalty advocates throughout the country to 
bring economic arguments to the public’s attention. 
 
4 HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT 
IN AMERICA, 1972–1994, at 5 (1996). 
5 See, e.g., N.J. SENATE BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS COMM., STATEMENT TO SENATE COMMITTEE 
SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE, NOS. 171 AND 2471, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
2006/Bills/S0500/171_S2.PDF; Carolyn McGinn, McGinn: Abolishing Death Penalty Way to Go, THE 
KANSAN (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.thekansan.com/article/20090227/NEWS/302279966#art-tit 
(stating that overturning the death penalty would save Kansas “more than $500,000 per case”); Press 
Release, Senator Loni Hancock, Hancock to Introduce Legislation to Ban Death Penalty (June 20, 
2011), http://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/2011-06-21-hancock-introduce-legislation-ban-death-penalty 
(stating that “capital punishment is an expensive failure” that “is helping to bankrupt us”). 
6 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration 
Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 161. 
7 See, e.g., id.; Rob Warden, How and Why Illinois Abolished the Death Penalty, 30 LAW & INEQ. 
245, 246, 278–79 (2012) (referring to the cost issue as one of the “many serendipitous milestones on the 
path to [death penalty] abolition in Illinois”). 
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Accordingly, the recent trend toward repealing death penalty laws 
should be viewed through the lens of an “interest-convergence” narrative. 
The concept of interest-convergence finds its roots in the late Derrick 
Bell’s work on the civil rights movement.8 Bell argued that racial 
desegregation in the United States occurred largely because African 
Americans’ interest in achieving equality converged with white 
policymakers’ interests in maintaining the country’s reputation during the 
Cold War and promoting economic growth in the South.9 Applying Bell’s 
interest-convergence theory to the death penalty context, this Note 
demonstrates that the abolition of the death penalty in several states has 
partly resulted from a convergence between anti-death penalty advocates’ 
interests in ending capital punishment and state lawmakers’ interests in 
balancing the budget and appearing fiscally responsible in a time of 
financial crisis. By focusing on the costs and inefficiencies of capital 
punishment, the anti-death penalty movement has given state policymakers 
a self-interested reason to abolish capital punishment: saving their 
constituents millions of dollars (and increasing their chances at reelection). 
Part I of this Note describes Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence 
theory, as well as ways in which contemporary scholars have applied and 
challenged the theory. Next, Part II discusses the history of the anti-death 
penalty movement and its previous focus on moral arguments against 
capital punishment. Part III then describes the movement’s recent shift 
towards creating an interest-convergence story by attacking state death 
penalty laws on fiscal grounds. This Part specifically focuses on the anti-
death penalty movement’s successful campaigns to repeal state death 
penalty statutes in New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and 
Maryland. Finally, Part IV examines challenges to the cost argument and 
suggests reasons why interest-convergence has helped end the death 
penalty in some states but not in others. 
This Note does not claim that interest-convergence is the only factor 
behind the repeal of death penalty statutes in New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Illinois, Connecticut, and Maryland. Scholars who have studied death 
penalty abolition in these states correctly point to certain state-specific 
conditions that made abolition possible. Rob Warden, for example, argues 
that exoneration of twelve death row inmates between 1987 and 1999 
played a central role in the abolition of the death penalty in Illinois.10 
Writing about death penalty abolition in New Jersey, Robert Martin 
maintains that the repeal would not have occurred without support from 
 
8 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524–26 (1980) (arguing that the interest-convergence between 
African Americans and white policymakers was one of the reasons behind the success of the civil rights 
movement). 
9 See id. at 524–25. 
10 Warden, supra note 7, at 245, 247–62. 
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key Democrats in the state legislature.11 Although state-specific factors are 
an important piece of the death penalty abolition puzzle, they do not 
explain why states in general are breaking the three-decade-long death 
penalty reform stalemate.12 By looking at the recent trend as an interest-
convergence story, however, one can see the reason for the state 
momentum—and why it is gaining speed. 
I. DERRICK BELL’S INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THEORY 
Derrick Bell, a law professor and pioneer of critical race theory, first 
introduced the idea of “interest-convergence” in the context of the civil 
rights movement.13 Bell argued that desegregation in the United States, and 
specifically the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,14 was not solely based on the Court’s interest in remedying 
injustice against blacks in America.15 Instead, the Court’s “sudden shift . . . 
away from the separate but equal doctrine and towards a commitment to 
desegregation” largely occurred because “it converge[d] with the interests 
of whites.”16 According to Bell, white policymakers were interested in 
ending racial segregation in the United States because of the “economic 
and political advances at home and abroad that would follow [its] 
abandonment.”17 They recognized that desegregation would not only 
improve the country’s international reputation during the Cold War, but 
also help further industrialization in the South.18 Ultimately, Bell believed 
that “[blacks] could not obtain meaningful relief until policymakers 
perceived that the relief blacks sought furthered [their own] interests.”19 
Numerous scholars have since applied Bell’s interest-convergence 
theory to modern racial justice issues, as well as other areas of law and 
policy.20 For example, many scholars, including Bell, have used interest-
 
11 See Martin, supra note 2, at 524–30. 
12 See Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3 (stating that in December 2007, “New Jersey [became] the first state 
to repeal the death penalty since the United States Supreme Court set the framework for the modern 
capital punishment system in 1976”). 
13 See generally Bell, supra note 8 (introducing “the interest-convergence dilemma” for civil rights 
litigation—the idea that whites would only help African Americans achieve equality in the United 
States if it was in their own interests); Fred A. Bernstein, Derrick Bell, Pioneering Law Professor and 
Civil Rights Advocate, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at A18. 
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
15 See Bell, supra note 8, at 524. 
16 Id. at 523–24. 
17 Id. at 524. 
18 Id. at 524–25. 
19 Derrick Bell, Jr., Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003). 
20 See Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 248, 248 & n.2 (2012) (listing the various scholars who have “extended 
[Bell’s theory] to other contexts”); see also, e.g., Justin Stec, The Deconcentration of Poverty as an 
Example of Derrick Bell’s Interest-Convergence Dilemma: White Neutrality Interests, Prisons, and 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
680 
convergence to explain affirmative action policies.21 According to Bell, 
affirmative action in higher education developed because of a convergence 
between minority students’ interests in attending elite universities and 
businesses’ interests in having their future employees exposed to a diverse 
student body.22 In other words, universities enacted affirmative action 
programs because they made their student bodies more appealing to 
employers, thereby benefiting the universities. They did not enact 
affirmative action programs—at least not solely—out of an equitable 
interest in remedying social consequences of past discrimination.23 
Similarly, other scholars argue that minorities can prevent racial 
discrimination in employment by appealing to employers’ interest in a 
diverse work environment.24 
Fewer scholars have applied Bell’s interest-convergence theory 
outside of racial contexts. Applying interest-convergence to animal rights, 
Joseph Lubinski argues that humans usually only act to protect animal 
rights when doing so serves a human interest.25 Accordingly, he suggests 
that activists can achieve animal rights reform by, for example, pointing to 
studies that link eating meat with an increased risk of cancer.26 Considering 
interest-convergence in a religious context, Stephen Feldman argues that 
religious minorities benefit from greater rights when their interests 
converge with the interests of Christians because Christians make up the 
majority of American society.27 Taking the interest-convergence concept 
further, Cynthia Lee developed the concept of “cultural convergence,” 
which posits that a criminal defendant’s use of cultural evidence to mitigate 
a charge or sentence—the so-called “cultural defense”—is more likely to 
 
Changing Inner Cities, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 30, 30 (2007) (applying Bell’s theory to modern 
poverty deconcentration programs). 
21 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 54–55 (2006); Amy Christian McCormick & 
Robert A. McCormick, Race and Interest Convergence in NCAA Sports, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 
17, 18–19 (2012). 
22 Bell, supra note 19, at 1624–26. 
23 See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic 
Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1767 (2004) (“[A]ffirmative action in 
college admissions is a partial remedy for the social consequences of past and present discrimination in 
public education.”). 
24 See, e.g., Joseph C. Feldman, Standing and Delivering on Title VII’s Promises: White 
Employees’ Ability to Sue Employers for Discrimination Against Nonwhites, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 569, 600–01 (1999); Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After 
Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 959 (2005). 
25 See Joseph Lubinski, Note, Screw the Whales, Save Me! The Endangered Species Act, Animal 
Protection, and Civil Rights, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 377, 407 (2003) (“[I]n the case of animals, society is likely to 
only act to substantially protect animal life when a human interest is implicated.”). 
26 Id. at 411. 
27 STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 
OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 273–75 (1997). 
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succeed in a U.S. court when the cultural norms underlying the defense 
converge with American cultural norms.28 Scholars have also used Bell’s 
interest-convergence theory in the context of poverty deconcentration 
policies,29 immigration reform,30 and same-sex marriage laws.31 
Not all scholars, on the other hand, have embraced Bell’s interest-
convergence theory. Namely, Justin Driver argues that by relying on 
moments of “fortuity,” Bell’s theory affords a “near total absence of 
agency to both black citizens and white citizens.”32 Driver’s critique is an 
important one. As Driver concedes, Bell did recognize the important role 
that civil rights activists played in achieving racial equality.33 Yet, Bell also 
referred to blacks as “fortuitous beneficiaries” of the interest-convergence 
phenomenon.34 Accordingly, Bell seemingly undermined the role of black 
activists by treating their work as secondary to the fortuitous events—the 
Cold War and economic growth in the South—that made policymakers 
view desegregation as beneficial to their own interests.35 Stephen Feldman, 
however, argues that Driver’s critique suffers from a “misunderstanding of 
the interest-convergence thesis as future-oriented.”36 Instead of using 
interest-convergence as “a strategy for the future,” Feldman argues that 
scholars should use interest-convergence only as “a tool . . . to help explain 
historical developments related to social justice.”37 Driver and Feldman are 
equally right and wrong. Feldman correctly notes that Bell used interest-
convergence to prove a historical pattern,38 with hindsight’s full benefit. At 
the same time, reducing interest-convergence to a retrospective theory with 
no value as an affirmative strategy for advocates would be ill-advised. 
 
28 See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural 
Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939 (2007). 
29 See Stec, supra note 20. 
30 See George A. Martínez, Arizona, Immigration, and Latinos: The Epistemology of Whiteness, the 
Geography of Race, Interest Convergence, and the View from the Perspective of Critical Theory, 
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 195–200 (2012). 
31 See Keeva Terry, Same-Sex Relationships, DOMA, and the Tax Code: Rethinking the Relevance 
of DOMA to Straight Couples, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 384, 384 (2011) (arguing that “the interests 
of same–sex couples are only accommodated when they coincide with the interests of heterosexual 
couples”). 
32 Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 165 (2011). 
33 Id. at 176 n.143 (noting that “Bell’s early formulation of the interest-convergence thesis 
demonstrated considerably greater awareness of . . . black agency” (citing Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial 
Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 28 (1976))). 
34 DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED 
HOPE FOR RACIAL REFORM 159 (2004). 
35 See Driver, supra note 32, at 176 (arguing that Bell’s interest-convergence theory underestimates 
the power of litigation strategies and mobilization). 
36 Feldman, supra note 20, at 256. 
37 Id. at 259. 
38 Id. 
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This Note supports Bell’s interest-convergence theory and refutes 
Driver’s view that interest-convergence and agency are incompatible.39 It 
also refutes Feldman’s argument that interest-convergence cannot be 
forward-looking.40 After discovering the substantial cost implications of 
state death penalty laws, anti-death penalty advocates started to emphasize 
the economic benefits that would result from abolition of the death 
penalty.41 They created an interest-convergence story that aligned the 
interests of death penalty advocates with nonmoral interests of state 
policymakers and succeeded in influencing policymakers’ decisions to end 
capital punishment. This contradicts Feldman’s suggestion that advocates 
cannot use interest-convergence as a strategy for achieving future social 
change. And although certain coincidental events, such as the 2008 
financial crisis, were likely necessary for the cost argument to succeed, the 
interest-convergence was made possible by the anti-death penalty 
movement’s cost-focused campaign. Thus, contrary to Driver’s argument,42 
the anti-death penalty movement did not wait passively for interest-
convergence to occur. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT, 1790S–1990S 
Although a powerful anti-death penalty movement itself cannot bring 
an end to capital punishment in the United States, “it is a necessary 
precondition.”43 Between the 1790s and 1990s, anti-death penalty 
advocates led numerous campaigns to abolish capital punishment 
throughout the country. Specifically, they argued for an end to the death 
penalty on grounds that it was morally wrong, and even unconstitutional. 
Yet, the movement’s moral arguments failed to convince state legislatures 
or the U.S. Supreme Court to put an end to capital punishment. In fact, by 
the end of the twentieth century, the death penalty in America was thriving. 
A. The Early Years 
Americans first started to voice their opposition to the death penalty 
when the United States gained independence from England in the 
eighteenth century.44 Although capital punishment was less prevalent in the 
 
39 See Driver, supra note 32, at 175–76 (“[A]ccord[ing] [them] an almost complete absence of 
agency[,] . . . interest-convergence . . . views black people as mere ‘fortuitous beneficiaries’ and 
instructs them to expect . . . advances toward racial equality . . . .”). 
40 Feldman, supra note 20, at 257 (arguing that “interest-convergence [is not] a forward-looking 
thesis that . . . predict[s] future behavior”). 
41 See infra Part III. 
42 See generally Driver, supra note 32, at 190 (stating that “[a] leading consequence of subscribing 
to the interest-convergence theory as the only (or even the predominant) method of achieving reform is 
its inculcation of passivity in its adherents”). 
43 HAINES, supra note 4. 
44 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 336 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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American colonies, by the eighteenth century, each colony recognized an 
average of twelve capital crimes.45 During the anti-death penalty 
movement’s early years, advocates based their opposition to the death 
penalty solely on moral arguments. They generally argued that it is morally 
wrong to kill another human being, whether that killing is done by an 
individual or the state.46 
In contrast to later years, anti-death penalty advocates in the late 1700s 
focused their efforts on narrowing death-eligible offenses to particularly 
heinous crimes, rather than abolishing the death penalty altogether.47 For 
example, Benjamin Rush, one of the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence, worked with the then-Pennsylvania Attorney General to 
repeal the death penalty in Pennsylvania for all offenses except for first-
degree murder.48 Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, and James Madison also all 
supported limiting the use of the death penalty.49 
The anti-death penalty movement shifted towards a fight for abolition 
in the 1800s.50 Many Americans, who, like those who opposed slavery, 
called themselves “abolitionists,” lobbied for death penalty abolition bills 
in state legislatures throughout the mid-1800s.51 Anti-death penalty 
lobbyists helped abolish capital punishment in Michigan in 1847,52 Rhode 
Island in 1852, and Wisconsin in 1853,53 as well as several other states at 
the turn of the century.54 Their success, however, was temporary: all but 
three of the states reversed the legislation by the end of World War I.55 
In the 1920s, the newly created American League to Abolish Capital 
Punishment (ALACP) helped to reenergize the anti-death penalty 
movement. The ALACP’s primary goals included coordinating campaigns 
 
45 Id. at 335. 
46 See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 3–5 (1989); Furman, 408 U.S. at 296–97 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
47 See HAINES, supra note 4, at 8 (“[W]hereas relatively few [abolitionists] called for complete 
abolition of the death penalty during the eighteenth century, many more did so by the early 1830s.”). 
48 Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement 
in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2002). 
49 Id. at 6 n.26. 
50 See id. at 7 (describing the anti-death penalty’s abolition efforts in the 1800s). 
51 HAINES, supra note 4, at 5, 8. 
52 Michigan only retained capital punishment for individuals who committed treason against the 
state. Phillip English Mackey, Introduction to VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1787–1975, at xxvi (Phillip English Mackey ed., 1976). 
53 Id. at xxvi–xxviii. 
54 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 372 app. I (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (listing seven 
other states that abolished capital punishment between 1872 and 1914). 
55 Id. at 339–40 (stating that four states reinstituted capital punishment “under the nervous tension 
of World War I”). Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were the only states that did not restore capital 
punishment at this time. Id. at 372 app. I (listing states that abolished and restored the death penalty 
between 1846 and 1968). 
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to introduce state abolition bills and educating the public about capital 
punishment, including the moral and practical problems involved with the 
practice.56 The ALACP also helped undermine the deterrence rationale for 
the death penalty by conducting some of the first empirical investigations 
on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.57 The ALACP argued that, 
contrary to the arguments of death penalty supporters, the death penalty 
does not deter dangerous criminals from committing crimes.58 The 
organization’s founders, including Clarence Darrow and Lewis Lawes,59 
were also some of the first activists to present information on racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing.60 Despite the influential role that the 
ALACP played in the anti-death penalty movement, the organization failed 
to achieve any changes in state death penalty policies.61 
 
56 HAINES, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
57 Id.; see Jay Holmes, Retention of Death Penalty Favored by Judges, Lawyers, AMSTERDAM 
RECORDER, Sept. 12, 1957, at 11 (stating that the ALACP and other organizations disagreed with claim 
that capital punishment deterred crime). Supporters of the death penalty argue that the threat of capital 
punishment deters people from committing capital offenses more than the threat of long-term 
imprisonment because death is unarguably the most severe sanction. Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. 
Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 44–45 (2000). 
58 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 218 (2002) (“The 
American League to Abolish Capital Punishment collected homicide data from the Census Bureau to 
demonstrate that the states with capital punishment had an average homicide rate more than twice as 
high as those without.”). The problem with the deterrence argument, for both sides of the debate, is that 
the deterrent effect of the death penalty is difficult to prove. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184–
85 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (stating that the results of 
statistical attempts to evaluate the deterrent effect of the death penalty have been inconclusive); David 
P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. 
J. SOC. 139, 146 (1980) (arguing that capital punishment has a short-term, but not long-term deterrent 
effect). Compare Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and 
Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741, 741 (1977) (arguing that “[f]indings indicate a substantial 
deterrent effect of [capital] punishment on murder and related violent crimes”), with William J. Bowers 
& Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s Research on Capital Punishment, 
85 YALE L.J. 187, 187 (1975) (arguing that Ehrlich’s research on capital punishment “failed to provide 
any reliable evidence that the death penalty deters murder”). 
59 See MICHAEL KRONENWETTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 119, 170 (2d 
ed. 2001) (listing Clarence Darrow and Lewis Lawes as two founders of the ALACP). 
60 See, e.g., CLARENCE DARROW, FARMINGTON 212–13 (1904); KRONENWETTER, supra note 59, at 
119; Lewis E. Lawes, The Death Penalty at Sing Sing, 59 SURV. MIDMONTHLY 69, 70 (1927). 
61 In fact, during the 1930s, there were more executions than in any other decade. THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 10 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). From 1930 to 
1939, 1667 prisoners were executed in the United States. LARRY J. SIEGAL & CLEMENS BARTOLLAS, 
CORRECTIONS TODAY 304 (2011). At the same time, Gallup conducted its first poll on the death penalty 
in 1936 and found that 59% of Americans supported imposing capital punishment for murder 
convictions. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Death Penalty, GALLUP]. 
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B. The Mid-Twentieth Century 
The anti-death penalty movement became more powerful in the 1950s 
and helped accomplish important legislative reforms, some of which were 
permanent. Between 1957 and 1965, anti-death penalty advocates helped 
pass abolition bills in Delaware, Oregon, West Virginia, Hawaii, and 
Alaska.62 Meanwhile, Vermont, New York, and New Mexico passed 
legislation that limited the death penalty to extraordinary offenses.63 At the 
same time, the yearly rate of executions started to decline, especially in the 
northern and western regions of the country.64 For example, while 199 
executions took place in 1935, there were 117 executions in 1945 and only 
76 executions by 1955.65 
Along with the declining rate of executions, the establishment of 
several anti-death penalty organizations in the 1950s and 1960s 
strengthened the movement’s efforts. Some of these organizations, 
including Citizens Against Legalized Murder (CALM), the New Jersey 
Council to Abolish Capital Punishment, and the Ohio Committee to 
Abolish Capital Punishment were affiliated with the ALACP.66 These 
organizations inspired the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to 
come out against the death penalty in 1965 and establish its “Capital 
Punishment Project” in the 1970s to help coordinate the activities of anti-
death penalty organizations throughout the country.67 
Despite growth in the anti-death penalty movement in the 1950s and 
1960s, the movement faced a fairly major setback in 1962 when the 
American Law Institute (ALI) decided not to recommend the abolition of 
the death penalty when it created the Model Penal Code (MPC)—a largely 
successful attempt to codify criminal law in the United States.68 Before 
creating the MPC, the ALI commissioned Thorsten Sellin—a renowned 
criminologist at the University of Pennsylvania,69 as well as a board 
member of the ALACP70—to produce a major research report addressing 
capital punishment.71 Sellin’s research focused on main issues within the 
death penalty debate at the time, including deterrence, proportionality, and 
 
62 See Kirchmeier, supra note 48, at 11–12. 
63 WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–1982, at 9 
(1984). 
64 HAINES, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
65 Id. at 12. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. at 25, 49. 
68 See Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence of the Model Penal Code 
on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 190, 202–06 (2004). 
69 Franklin E. Zimring, The Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the 
Model Penal Code, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1396, 1400 (2005). 
70 HAINES, supra note 4, at 11. 
71 Id.; see THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959). 
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racial discrimination.72 Despite Sellin’s findings that capital punishment 
had no deterrent effect on homicide rates,73 however, the ALI decided not 
to recommend abolition.74 
C. The Civil Rights Era 
While the anti-death penalty movement had previously focused on 
abolishing capital punishment through state legislation, in the late 1960s, 
the movement’s focus shifted to the courts. Several organizations, such as 
the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF), 
focused on challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty by 
appealing capital cases.75 For a short period in the 1960s, public support for 
capital punishment reached its lowest levels in recorded history, with 
almost half of Americans opposing the death penalty.76 
The LDF developed a death penalty “moratorium strategy” in 1966.77 
Under its strategy, the LDF aimed to block all executions in the United 
States by representing every death row inmate who sought the 
organization’s assistance.78 At the same time, the organization challenged 
the constitutionality of the death penalty on grounds that complete jury 
discretion in capital cases violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution.79 To carry out the moratorium strategy, LDF reached 
out to a number of national and state anti-death penalty organizations and 
intervened in hundreds of capital cases throughout the country.80 In 1968, 
the LDF organized a National Conference on Capital Punishment in New 
York for over one hundred lawyers and advocates with the goal of 
developing a more cohesive litigation strategy for ending the death 
penalty.81 
 
72 Zimring, supra note 69, at 1407. 
73 SELLIN, supra note 71, at 63 (“Any one who carefully examines the above data is bound to arrive 
at the conclusion that the death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence on the extent or fluctuating 
rates of capital crimes. It has failed as a deterrent.”). 
74 See Covey, supra note 68, at 200–06; Zimring, supra note 69, at 1400–01. 
75 See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 49 (2011). 
76 Andrew Kohut, The Declining Support for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33 
(stating that “by the mid 1960’s . . . most people were opposed” to the death penalty, and “[p]ublic 
support dropped to 42 percent, a 50-year low, in a 1966 Gallup poll”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman 
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 50 (2007) (“[1966] marked the lowest level of death penalty 
support in recorded history . . . .”). 
77 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
AGENDA 33 (1986); Michael Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death Penalty: The Strategy Behind 
Furman, 82 YALE L.J. 1111, 1112 (1973). 
78 See Meltsner, supra note 77. 
79 Kirchmeier, supra note 48, at 13–14. 
80 MELTSNER, supra note 75, at 80, 84. 
81 Meltsner, supra note 77, at 1117 (“The purpose of the 1968 conference, however, was not 
technical; its aim was to bring the participants together for a face-to-face encounter, and at this it 
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In 1972, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. 
Georgia82 was a key victory for the LDF, as well as the anti-death penalty 
movement in general.83 The decision struck down state death penalty 
statutes across the United States. The Court held that by giving juries 
unguided discretion to impose the death penalty, states were administering 
capital punishment in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner in violation 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.84 Justice Marshall, in his 
concurring opinion, emphasized the “partial successes” of anti-death 
penalty activists in tempering capital punishment in the United States.85 In 
December 1971, six months before the Supreme Court decided Furman, 
Congress held its first hearing on the death penalty in twelve years.86 In 
consideration of the Court’s upcoming decision, members of the House 
Judiciary Committee proposed a bill to suspend the death penalty 
throughout the United States in order to give state authorities and Congress 
more time to reexamine the constitutional issues surrounding capital 
punishment.87 However, Congress never passed a bill to suspend the death 
penalty, and the effects of the Furman decision were short-lived. 
D. The 1980s and 1990s 
Many people thought that Furman signaled the end of the death 
penalty in the United States.88 In reality, however, Furman had the opposite 
effect and worked to reverse the previously increasing momentum in many 
states towards death penalty abolition. In response to Furman, twenty-eight 
states passed new death penalty statutes that complied with the Supreme 
Court’s mandate by making the capital sentencing process less arbitrary.89 
In a series of decisions in 1976, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a majority of these state death penalty statutes.90 At the 
 
succeeded handsomely. This first confrontation of numerous professionals who had previously worked 
alone gave the movement a cohesion that it had lacked.”). 
82 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam). 
83 See HAINES, supra note 4, at 14; Meltsner, supra note 77, at 1111. 
84 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40; see also id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
85 Id. at 341–42 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
86 See Capital Punishment: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. No. 3 on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 18 
(1972) (statement of Senator Kastenmeier) [hereinafter 1972 Hearings]. 
87 Id. 
88 See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Cruel and Unusual Punishments, 86 HARV. L. REV. 76, 85 
(1972) (“Whatever the possibilities for narrower death penalty statutes after Furman, the Court has 
prohibited capital punishment in the overwhelming majority of cases . . . [and] Furman may contain the 
seeds . . . of a complete proscription of the death penalty in the future.”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 239 (per 
curiam). 
89 HAINES, supra note 4, at 14. 
90 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
(plurality opinion); see also Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the 
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same time, public support for capital punishment increased from a low of 
42% in 1966 to 66% by 1976.91 
In 1987, the anti-death penalty movement suffered another significant 
blow when the Supreme Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp that evidence of 
racial discrimination in capital sentencing did not violate the Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendment.92 As a result of the judicial disappointments they 
suffered post-Furman, anti-death penalty advocates realized that they must 
try—once again—to turn state legislatures and the public against capital 
punishment. Their public education campaigns throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, however, did little to turn public opinion against the death penalty. 
By the 1990s, capital punishment was “flourishing” in the United States.93 
In 1993, thirty-eight people were executed throughout the country, which 
was more than any other year since the 1960s.94 Also, more than 70% of 
Americans supported capital punishment during the 1980s and 1990s.95 
Similarly, the anti-death penalty’s lobbying efforts were fruitless in 
light of the robust public support for capital punishment in the country. At 
the time, any elected officials who publicly opposed the death penalty 
essentially risked sacrificing their political careers.96 For instance, in the 
1988 presidential race between Michael Dukakis and George H.W. Bush, 
Dukakis lost significant support from voters because he said that he 
opposed the death penalty in a televised debate.97 By the 1990s, it was clear 
that the anti-death penalty movement needed a new strategy. 
III. THE MODERN ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT’S FOCUS ON COST 
As early as the 1980s, people on both sides of the death penalty debate 
started to become aware of the costs involved in capital punishment 
compared to life imprisonment.98 In fact, in Furman, Justice Marshall 
recognized that “[w]hen all is said and done, there can be no doubt that it 
 
Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 800–01 (1998) (“In the 1976 cases, the Supreme 
Court upheld statutes from Florida, Georgia, and Texas . . . [and] struck down statutes from Louisiana 
and North Carolina . . . .”). 
91 Death Penalty, GALLUP, supra note 61. 
92 481 U.S. 279, 298–99, 308 (1987). 
93 HAINES, supra note 4, at 3. 
94 Id. 
95 Support for capital punishment was above 70% in every Gallup poll conducted between 1985 
and 1999. One poll from 1981 showed that 66% of respondents supported the death penalty, while data 
from 1982–1984 is not available. Death Penalty, GALLUP, supra note 61. 
96 Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty’s Strange Career, 26 WILSON Q., Spring 2002, at 70, 74. 
97 See id. 
98 See, e.g., Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life 
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 45, 47 (1989) (concluding that the 
death penalty costs more than life in prison); Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: 
Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1270 (1985) (arguing that the 
“death penalty process results in astronomical costs—both morally and financially”). 
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costs more to execute a man than to keep him in prison for life.”99 
Nevertheless, largely because of the scant data available on the costs of 
state death penalty systems, anti-death penalty advocates did not begin to 
use cost as an argument against capital punishment until the end of the 
1990s.100 Before then, cost, if mentioned at all, was generally used as an 
argument in support of the death penalty. For instance, in 1983, Ernest van 
den Haag, a prominent death penalty supporter, asserted that it was cheaper 
to execute a criminal than keep him in prison for most of his life.101 
Around the turn of the twenty-first century, research conducted by 
newspaper reporters and academics in various states began to reveal the 
high costs of the modern death penalty system.102 For example, in 1988, 
The Miami Herald reported that the cost of the death penalty in Florida was 
$3.2 million per execution compared to $600,000 for life imprisonment.103 
Similarly, The Dallas Morning News reported in 1992 that the trials and 
appeals of a capital case alone cost Texas $2.3 million per case on average, 
which was approximately three times the cost of imprisoning someone for 
forty years.104 In 1993, a report by professors at Duke University found that 
the death penalty cost North Carolina $2.16 million more per execution 
than murder cases with the sentence of life imprisonment.105 Columbia 
University published a report on capital punishment in 2000, which found 
 
99 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
100 Although scholars started to argue that the death penalty was costly as early as the 1990s, see, 
e.g., Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in 
American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 711, 719 (1990–1991), anti-death penalty 
advocates did not make this argument in their campaigns at the time. Ben Johnson from the Connecticut 
Network to Abolish the Death Penalty (CNADP) stated that the Connecticut anti-death penalty 
movement, for instance, did not start using the cost argument until it had figures on the costs of capital 
punishment in the state. Telephone Interview with Ben Johnson, former Exec. Dir., CNADP (Jan. 29, 
2013). 
101 Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 
26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 50 (2000). According to Jeremy Schroeder, the former Executive Director of the 
Illinois Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (ICADP), before the anti-death penalty movement 
focused on the cost argument, people assumed that the death penalty was more expensive than life in 
prison because it is counterintuitive that the death penalty would cost more. Telephone Interview with 
Jeremy Schroeder, former Exec. Dir., ICADP (Jan. 30, 2013). As a result, many Americans who 
supported the death penalty in the 1980s and 1990s cited the high costs of imprisonment as a reason for 
their position. Mark Costanzo & Lawrence T. White, An Overview of the Death Penalty and Capital 
Trials: History, Current Status, Legal Procedures, and Cost, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 1, 9 (1994); see 
Radelet & Borg, supra note 101 (citing a 1985 Gallup poll finding that one reason provided by 11% of 
Americans who supported the death penalty was that it would save costs). 
102 See Radelet & Borg, supra note 101. 
103 D. Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth as Expensive, MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 
1988, at 12A; Editorial, Judicial Wisdom, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 3, 1998, at 12A (referring to 
1988 Miami Herald study finding that Florida spent approximately $3.2 million per execution compared 
to $600,000 to imprison someone for life). 
104 Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at 1A. 
105 PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF LORI A. GRIES, THE COSTS 
OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 98 (1993). 
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that 68% of capital judgments were “seriously flawed” and that capital 
cases cost significantly more than noncapital ones.106 Consequently, the 
report concluded that “large amounts of resources are being wasted on 
cases that should never have been capital in the first place.”107 
These early reports on the fiscal realities of the death penalty came 
from different states and therefore varied in their estimates on the costs of 
capital punishment.108 Nonetheless, they all confirmed one thing: states 
would save millions of dollars if they replaced the death penalty with 
sentences of life imprisonment without parole. The high cost of the death 
penalty does not mean that the executions themselves are more expensive 
than keeping a criminal in prison for life. Rather, the high costs of the death 
penalty reflect the fact that capital prosecutions often involve lengthy trials 
and multiple appeals.109 Complex pretrial motions, jury selections, 
investigations, and expensive expert witnesses all add to the costs of death 
penalty cases.110 Meanwhile, the post-conviction phase of capital cases 
involves a technical appeals process that creates additional costs for both 
the prosecution and defense, with taxpayers typically footing the bill.111 
Taxpayers pay not only for the costs of the trials and appeals, but also for 
the extra costs of incarcerating capital prisoners in facilities separate from 
general prison populations.112 
In addition to research on the high costs of capital punishment, the 
anti-death penalty movement’s focus on the problem of wrongful 
convictions was a necessary predicate for the cost argument to succeed in 
 
106 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital 
Cases, 1973–1995, at 15–16 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., 
Paper No. 15, 2000). 
107 Id. at 16. 
108 Part of the reason for the difference in death penalty costs among states results from different 
capital sentencing procedures, as well as the frequency of capital prosecution, which is largely 
determined by the district attorneys in a particular area. Telephone Interview with Robert Owen, 
Clinical Professor, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law (Jan. 25, 2013). 
109 See Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the Ryan 
Commutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1363 (2010) (“Along the way, the [capital] appeals become more technical, more 
controversial, and more costly[,] . . . and the taxpayers pay for the costs . . . .”). 
110 Telephone Interview with Robert Owen, supra note 108 (capital defense attorneys must find 
detailed information about defendants’ lives for capital cases, which requires substantial time and 
work). 
111 See Costanzo & White, supra note 101, at 10–12 (explaining the costs of the capital punishment 
process); see also Frederic Block, Op-Ed., A Slow Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at A27 (stating 
that taxpayers typically pay for both the prosecution and defense of capital cases). Although some 
states, such as Florida, have attempted to reduce costs by placing time restrictions on post-conviction 
appeals, these laws may violate the due process rights of death row inmates. See Jonathan Mattise, 
Negron Death Penalty Law Challenged, STUART NEWS, June 28, 2013, at 1A. Moreover, the majority 
of costs stem from the pretrial and trial phases. Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 2009, at A22. Thus, laws limiting the appeals process are unlikely to result in much cost savings. 
112 See Bienen, supra note 109, at 1363, 1386. 
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convincing state legislatures to abolish the death penalty. Beginning in the 
1990s, the availability of DNA testing helped exonerate many death row 
inmates.113 In 1998, hundreds of anti-death penalty advocates, scholars, and 
journalists came to Chicago for the National Conference on Wrongful 
Convictions and the Death Penalty.114 Prior to the conference, advocates 
had not focused on wrongful convictions in capital cases as an area of 
serious concern.115 After the conference, however, the frequency of 
wrongful convictions became one of the main talking points for the anti-
death penalty movement.116 Evidence that people were being executed for 
crimes they did not commit undermined a main justification for the death 
penalty: retribution.117 When more than 100 people sentenced to death were 
innocent and thus did not “deserve” to die, it became much more difficult 
for death penalty supporters to rely on retribution as a justification for 
capital punishment.118 
The problem of wrongful convictions “trigger[ed a] reexamination of 
the costs and benefits of capital punishment” in a way that other challenges 
to the death penalty had failed to do.119 It encouraged several states to 
examine their death penalty policies in order to fix the errors in their capital 
sentencing process. In 2000, an extensive wrongful convictions campaign 
in Illinois helped lead to a temporary moratorium on capital punishment in 
the state until the government could review the system.120 Governor George 
Ryan stated that he “favor[ed] a moratorium, because [he had] grave 
concerns about [Illinois’s] shameful record of convicting innocent people 
and putting them on death row.”121 Around the same time, a coalition of 
 
113 The very first DNA exoneration occurred in 1989. Jay D. Aronson & Simon A. Cole, Science 
and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence, and the Debate over Capital Punishment in the United States, 
34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 603, 610–11 (2009) (“By 1996, sixty-five people had been exonerated on the 
basis of DNA evidence.”). 
114 Warden, supra note 7, at 252–53. 
115 Id. 
116 Telephone Interview with Lawrence Marshall, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (Feb. 4, 
2013). Professor Marshall used to be a professor at Northwestern University School of Law and 
organized the National Conference. 
117 Although retribution has not been considered a primary objective of criminal law in the United 
States for over half a century, it remains one of the primary reasons that the American public supports 
the death penalty. Banner, supra note 96, at 77. In the 1980s and 1990s, polls showed that the majority 
of Americans who were pro-capital punishment would still support the death penalty even if it did not 
result in fewer murders. Id. 
118 See Editorial, 110 Wrongful Convictions, and Counting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at A16. 
119 Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
573, 579 (2004). 
120 See generally id. at 578 (arguing that “[t]he engine driving [the 2000 moratorium] was a series 
of thirteen death row exonerations”). 
121 Press Release, Ill. Governor’s Office, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will 
Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000), available at 
http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/showpressrelease.cfm?subjectid=3&recnum=359. 
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Republicans and Democrats in Congress proposed a bill to combat 
wrongful convictions in death penalty cases.122 And in Kansas v. Marsh, 
four dissenting Supreme Court justices went so far as to state that the 
“repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences” made the death 
penalty system unconstitutional.123 
Once the anti-death penalty movement exposed the serious flaws in 
the death penalty system, it became more difficult for state legislators to 
claim that capital punishment was worth the millions of dollars in extra 
costs. Consequently, activists started to focus on the cost arguments against 
capital punishment by underscoring how states waste millions of dollars 
each year on inefficient death penalty systems. Some organizations, such as 
the ACLU, have produced their own studies on the high costs of capital 
punishment.124 Other organizations have tried to raise public awareness 
about the costs of capital punishment through online action reports, 
newspaper editorials, and lobbying efforts.125 In particular, organizations 
have emphasized the effect of capital punishment costs on already troubled 
state budgets.126 For example, in a 2009 report, the Death Penalty 
Information Center argued that there is “little support for continuing to 
spend enormous sums on an ineffective program when so many other areas 
of need are being short changed.”127 
Anti-death penalty advocates contend that the cost argument focuses 
not only on reducing state budget deficits, but also on opportunity costs.128 
Anti-death penalty campaigns in various states have argued that instead of 
spending millions of dollars on the death penalty, states would be better off 
using the money for other important state and local uses. For example, in 
New Jersey, Connecticut, and New Mexico, anti-death penalty advocates 
proposed that the money saved as a result of abolishing the death penalty 
should be used to provide additional law enforcement officers or victim 
assistance.129 In California, Proposition 34—a recently defeated ballot 
 
122 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (2003); Editorial, Toward Death Penalty Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2003, at A16. 
123 548 U.S. 163, 208, 211 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding that because of the prevalence of 
wrongful convictions, the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment). 
124 See, e.g., NATASHA MINSKER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL., THE HIDDEN DEATH 
TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (2008). 
125 See supra Part IV.A–F, which discusses the various strategies carried out by anti-death penalty 
organizations throughout the country. 
126 See MINSKER, supra note 124, at 3–4. 
127 RICHARD C. DIETER, DPIC, SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE DEATH PENALTY IN A 
TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS 6 (2009). 
128 See New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Hearing 72–73 (Sept. 13, 2006) (statement of 
Patrick Murray, Director, Monmouth University Polling Institute) [hereinafter Murray Testimony]. 
129 See New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission 87–88 (Oct. 25, 2006) (statement of Celeste 
Fitzgerald, Director, New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty) [hereinafter Fitzgerald 
Testimony]; Cost, N.M. REPEAL, http://www.nmrepeal.org/issues/cost (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); 
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initiative to abolish capital punishment130—included a proposal to direct the 
over $100 million annual savings to law enforcement agencies for 
investigations of homicide and rape cases.131 When budget shortfalls force 
state governments to make cuts, anti-death penalty advocates argue that 
lawmakers should choose to get rid of the death penalty over other 
necessary programs. 
A. Cost and Abolition in New Jersey 
The New Jersey legislature’s decision to abolish the death penalty in 
2007132 illustrates the effectiveness of the cost argument for the anti-death 
penalty movement. In 1999, anti-death penalty activists Lorry Post and 
Celeste Fitzgerald established New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death 
Penalty (NJADP).133 Rather than focusing their lobbying efforts on moral 
and religious arguments, Fitzgerald and NJADP emphasized the costs of 
the death penalty, wrongful executions, and the fact that New Jersey had 
not executed anyone in forty years.134 Specifically, NJADP commissioned a 
fiscal study of the state’s death penalty system, which found that abolishing 
the death penalty would save New Jersey more than $11 million each 
year.135 According to Fitzgerald, by focusing on the costs of capital cases, 
NJADP was able to “attract [support from] people who thought the death 
penalty was simply another waste of time and money.”136 
Partly as a result of the lobbying efforts of the NJADP, in 2006 the 
New Jersey legislature selected a state-sponsored Death Penalty Study 
Commission to examine the effectiveness of the state’s death penalty 
 
Victims’ Families, CNADP, http://www.cnadp.org/resources/issues/victims-families/ (last visited Apr. 
5, 2014). 
130 California voters defeated Proposition 34 on November 6, 2012. State Voters Back Death 
Penalty, DAILY POST (PALO ALTO), Nov. 8, 2012, at 10. 
131 TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE 95, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop34. 
132 Peters, supra note 12. 
133 R. Erik Lillquist et al., Panel III—Legislative Moratorium and the New Jersey Death Penalty 
Study Commission, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 137 (2008) [hereinafter Panel III—Legislative 
Moratorium]. 
134 Making History: The Repeal of the Death Penalty in New Jersey, METROPOLITAN CORP. 
COUNS., Mar. 2008, at 50. Although more than sixty people were sentenced to death between 1963 and 
2007, the majority of sentences were overturned on appeal. Panel III—Legislative Moratorium, supra 
note 133, at 139 n.7. At the time New Jersey repealed its death penalty statute, the state had eight men 
on death row. Editorial, A Long Time Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at A22. 
135 Robert Schwaneberg, N.J. Panel Counts Cost of Death Penalty, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 13, 2006, 
at 29; Press Release, NJADP, New Report Finds Death Penalty Cost New Jersey Tax Payers $250 
Million Since 1982 (Nov. 21, 2005), available at http://www.njadp.org/forms/cost/cost%20study%20
release.html (stating that NJADP commissioned the New Jersey Policy Perspective report). 
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policy.137 The Commission held hearings and heard from New Jersey 
residents on both sides of the debate. Testimonies provided evidence about 
the significant costs of the death penalty, as well as polls showing that only 
36% of New Jersey residents preferred the death penalty to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.138 In addition to relying on 
savings estimates from various New Jersey state agencies, the Commission 
considered cost studies conducted by other states.139 In its 2007 report, the 
Commission recommended that the New Jersey legislature abolish the 
death penalty in the state.140 It found that capital punishment in New Jersey 
did not “rationally serve[] a legitimate penological intent,” and that “[t]he 
costs of the death penalty are greater than the costs of life in prison without 
parole.”141 
Around the same time of the Death Penalty Study Commission’s 
report, New Jersey’s financial landscape had taken a turn for the worse. In 
1999, when the NJADP started making its cost arguments, the state had 
few fiscal problems. The Newark-based Star-Ledger, for instance, reported 
that the 1999–2000 budget was “heavy on generosity and short on pain.”142 
By 2007, however, it was widely recognized that “New Jersey ha[d] been 
living beyond its means for more than a decade.”143 Although the national 
financial crisis had not yet hit, in 2007 New Jersey was one of only a 
handful of states facing a structural deficit.144 Indeed, New Jersey’s per 
capita debt burden at the time was the third highest in the nation.145 
Accordingly, in February 2007 Governor Corzine warned that the state 
legislature would have to make some “tough choices” in order to mitigate 
“the avalanche of growing fixed costs that hang over the state.”146 
When Fitzgerald testified before the New Jersey Senate, she 
encouraged lawmakers “to seriously consider the money-saving suggestion 
of replacing the death penalty with life without parole . . . and the many 
other ways that money could be spent.”147 And in December 2007, New 
 
137 See Panel III—Legislative Moratorium, supra note 133, at 141. 
138 Murray Testimony, supra note 128, at 68–69, 71–72. 
139 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION 
REPORT 31–33 (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf. 
140 Id. at 2. 
141 Id. at 1. 
142 Robert Schwaneberg & Joe Donohue, Whitman Will Submit $19.2 Billion Budget Plan, STAR-
LEDGER, Jan. 24, 1999, at 1. 
143 Jon Shure, The Balancing Act, RECORD, Feb. 25, 2007, at O-1 (referencing Gov. Corzine’s 
statement during budget address). 
144 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF N.J. BUDGET: FISCAL 
YEAR 2007–2008, at iii (2007) [hereinafter NJ FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET]. 
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147 New Jersey Legislature, Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee Public Hearing on 
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Jersey became the first state to abolish the death penalty legislatively since 
1976.148 Achieving the twenty-one to sixteen vote in the New Jersey 
legislature was not easy.149 However, NJADP brought cost to the forefront 
of the debate at the exact time legislators were particularly interested in 
finding ways to save money for the state. 
B. Cost and Abolition in New Mexico 
Cost also played a significant role in New Mexico’s decision to 
abolish the death penalty in 2009. In New Mexico, the anti-death penalty 
movement argued that money spent on capital punishment should be used 
to help victims’ families.150 This was particularly successful because it 
undermined one of the main arguments in support of the death penalty: 
restitution for victims’ families.151 In February 2009, the New Mexico 
House voted forty to twenty-eight to repeal the state’s death penalty statute, 
and on March 13, 2009, the Senate voted twenty-four to eighteen in favor 
of repeal.152 Before signing the bill to abolish the death penalty, Governor 
Bill Richardson, a longstanding death penalty supporter, cited his concerns 
about wrongful convictions. He also added that cost was “a valid reason [to 
support the abolition of the death penalty] in this era of austerity and tight 
budgets.”153 Indeed, in the months leading up to the repeal, New Mexico’s 
government was facing a $454 million budget shortfall.154 Although New 
Mexico’s economy grew rapidly in the early 2000s,155 the 2008 financial 
crisis forced the state government to make drastic cuts for the first time in a 
decade.156 
 
for Alternatives to the Death Penalty (NJADP)), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislative
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of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at B1 (stating that New Jersey’s repeal bill passed in 
the Senate 21 to 16). 
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151 See THE ROAD TO ABOLITION?: THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
32 (CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. & AUSTIN SARAT eds., 2009) (discussing the argument by supporters of 
the death penalty that capital punishment is needed to help victims’ families). 
152 LARRY W. KOCH, COLIN WARK & JOHN F. GALLIHER, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN DEATH 
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153 Ian Urbina, In Push to End Death Penalty, Some States Cite Cost-Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2009, at A1 (statement of Governor Bill Richardson). 
154 Dan Boyd, State Faces Big Budget Squeeze: Broad Funding Cuts Likely Next Fiscal Year, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 9, 2008, at A1. 
155 See Aaron Baca, Looking Up, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 1 (reporting that New 
Mexico had the second-fastest-growing economy in the U.S. at the time in terms of job growth); 
Editorial, Be Careful with Revenue Windfall, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 17, 2005, at B2 (reporting an 
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When the effort to abolish New Mexico’s death penalty began in 1997, 
advocates attempted to introduce the cost argument into the death penalty 
debate.157 At the time, however, there was very little information available 
about the costs of New Mexico’s death penalty system.158 Thus, anti-death 
penalty advocates did not focus on costs as a central part of their campaign 
until several years later.159 
Between 2004 and 2008, as more information on costs of the death 
penalty system emerged—and the state’s budget deficit grew—New 
Mexico’s anti-death penalty campaign shifted towards a greater emphasis 
on cost. Although the New Mexico government never commissioned a 
statewide study on the costs of capital punishment,160 the State Bar’s Task 
Force on the Administration of the Death Penalty in New Mexico published 
a report in 2004 outlining the reasons for the high costs of capital cases.161 
Around the same time, then New Mexico Supreme Court Justice Bosson 
estimated that the cost of a capital case in New Mexico was six times 
higher than noncapital murder cases.162 The cost argument in New Mexico 
was also strengthened by cost studies from other states, such as North 
Carolina, which found that capital punishment cost more than life 
imprisonment.163 
 
157 For example, when Representative Gail Chasey (formerly Gail Beam) sponsored a bill to repeal 
the death penalty in 1999, she argued that the death penalty did not deter crime, cost more than life in 
prison without parole, and risked sentencing innocent people to death. Bruce Daniels, Proposal May 
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Executions, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Feb. 25, 1999, at A1, available at 1999 WLNR 2353025; see also 
Carmen E. Garza, Op-Ed, Death Penalty Legal Work Requires Twice the Effort, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 
29, 1998, at A11 (explaining why “the death-penalty is just a big-tag merchandise in tight-budget 
times”). 
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million. See Colleen Heild, Sureño Tab Costs Public $4.3 Million, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 3, 1999, at 
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159 For example, the Fiscal Impact Report for the 2005 House Bill to abolish the death penalty 
suggested that the bill’s fiscal implications would be negligible. N.M. LEGISLATIVE FIN. COMM., 
FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, HB 576, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/
05%20regular/firs/HB0576.pdf. But cf. Deborah Baker, Senate Kills Attempt to Repeal Death Penalty, 
ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 10, 1999, at A4, available at 1999 WLNR 2348036 (stating that State 
Senator Manny Aragon argued that repealing the death penalty “is both fiscally responsible and a bit 
more civilized”). 
160 See N.M. LEGISLATIVE FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, HB 285, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/firs/HB0285.pdf. 
161 TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE ADMIN. OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN N.M., STATE BAR OF N.M., 
FINAL REPORT (2004), available at http://www.nmbar.org/attorneys/lawpubs/tskfrcdthpnltyrprt.pdf. 
162 Cost, supra note 129. 
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The growing strength of the cost argument in New Mexico’s death 
penalty debate is illustrated by a comparison of Fiscal Impact Reports for 
Representative Gail Chasey’s abolition bills in 2001 (HB 239) and 2005 
(HB 576) with the Fiscal Report for the abolition bill in 2009 (HB 285). 
The Fiscal Impact Report for the 2001 bill suggested that costs “may 
ultimately decrease with the repeal of the death penalty,” though it also 
recognized the possibility that costs could be higher.164 While not explicitly 
stating that repealing the death penalty would save money, the 2005 Fiscal 
Impact Report indicated that jury and witness costs for a death penalty case 
amounted to $20,000–$25,000 compared to $7000–$8000 for a non-death 
penalty case.165 In contrast, the 2009 Fiscal Report stated that abolition of 
the death penalty would save New Mexico several million dollars each 
year.166 
By 2008, NM Repeal (New Mexico’s largest anti-death penalty 
advocacy group) and others used cost as one of their main “talking points” 
when lobbying state legislators to support abolition.167 Although few 
legislators mentioned cost when they publicly spoke in support of repeal, 
state legislators were well aware of the cost implications of the bill by the 
time they cast their votes in 2009.168 For instance, David Keys, a professor 
of criminology at New Mexico State University, testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and told the panel that a single execution in New 
Mexico cost the state between $2.75 and $5 million.169 Viki Harrison, the 
former Executive Director of NM Repeal, believes that state policymakers 
considered cost as a factor in casting their votes, even if they did not say so 
explicitly.170 
According to Harrison, the cost-effectiveness argument was 
particularly successful in New Mexico because the state had only executed 
one person since 1960.171 As a result, in light of the high costs of the death 
penalty, state lawmakers were more inclined to vote for abolition because 
 
164 See N.M. LEGISLATIVE FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, HB 239, at 2 (2001), available at 
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167. 
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of Representatives (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with author). 
170 Elkey, supra note 168, at 13. 
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Mar. 19, 2009, at A16. 
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most defendants in capital cases ended up with life sentences anyway.172 
During the House debate on the bill in 2009, Representative Gail Chasey 
argued, “[I]n 48 years we’ve spent several million dollars a year for this 
one execution. That’s not much of a return.”173 
In addition to arguing that the death penalty was expensive and rarely 
used, anti-death penalty advocates pointed out that the money used for New 
Mexico’s death penalty system diverted resources from other state needs, 
such as services for victims’ families.174 Murder Victims’ Families for 
Reconciliation (MVFR), which played a large role in the effort to defeat the 
death penalty in New Mexico, maintained that the death penalty did not 
redress problems faced by victims’ families.175 MVFR worked with Chasey 
and NM Repeal to create a list of victims’ services that could be established 
as a result of the repeal’s cost savings.176 A 2008 statewide poll confirmed 
that the majority of New Mexico residents—64%—supported replacing the 
death penalty with life in prison without parole and allocating the saved 
resources to services for victims’ families.177 The poll persuaded state 
legislators to support the repeal by reassuring them that they would not face 
public opposition if they voted for the bill.178 
C. Cost and Abolition in Illinois 
Anti-death penalty advocates in Illinois considered cost a crucial part 
of their strategy to convince legislators to repeal the state’s death penalty 
law in 2011. The ACLU, an organization with one of the most active anti-
death penalty campaigns in the state, argued that Illinois’s death penalty 
was “expensive and [an] ineffective use of scarce resources.”179 Between 
2002 and 2010, Illinois’s budget deficit climbed from $1.4 billion to $13 
billion.180 Like activists in New Jersey and New Mexico, Illinois advocacy 
 
172 See Urbina, supra note 153. 
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organizations also claimed that the state’s capital punishment system 
ultimately harmed victims’ families by depriving them of resources that 
could otherwise be used for therapy and law enforcement programs.181 
The Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), which voted to support 
abolition of Illinois’s death penalty in 2008, also emphasized the cost and 
inefficiencies of capital punishment in its efforts to push for death penalty 
repeal. In a letter to Governor Pat Quinn, the ISBA stressed that $100 
million had been spent on Illinois’s death penalty between 2003 and 2010, 
and “it continues to be a legal crapshoot on who gets executed and who 
doesn’t.”182 The ISBA also argued that the three main justifications for the 
death penalty—incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution—were no longer 
valid.183 Finally, the ISBA noted that Illinois residents supported life 
without parole over the death penalty by a 2-to-1 margin (64% to 30%) 
when they considered the millions of dollars spent on death penalty cases 
every year.184 In other words, the IBSA showed that Illinois’s death penalty 
involved substantial costs with next to no benefit. 
Jeremy Schroeder, the former Executive Director of the Illinois 
Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (ICADP), affirms that the cost-
saving aspect of repealing the death penalty helped the organization’s anti-
death penalty campaign.185 Namely, he says that the cost argument helped 
ICADP get its “foot in the door” with legislators who had previously 
supported capital punishment.186 ICADP used polling data, moreover, to 
show legislators that the death penalty was no longer “the third rail”; 
politicians could speak out against the death penalty without hurting their 
chances of reelection.187 Ultimately, Schroeder believes “[i]t was the cost 
savings plus having such a broken system that [the state hadn’t] used for 11 
years” that persuaded Illinois lawmakers to vote for repeal.188 
The impact of the cost argument is illustrated in statements by Illinois 
legislators leading up to repeal. In 2011, during the Illinois Senate floor 
debate on the bill (S.B. 3539) to abolish the death penalty, senators cited 
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the costs of the death penalty as one of their reasons for supporting the 
repeal bill. State Senator Jeffrey Schoenberg, who had previously 
supported the death penalty, mentioned the costs of the state’s death 
penalty system and argued that “whether you actually believe that the death 
penalty is a deterrent or not, it’s an indisputable fact on the basis of 
economics alone . . . [that] our system of capital punishment clearly does 
not work in Illinois.”189 State Representative Karen Yarbrough, who 
sponsored the House bill to abolish the death penalty, also based her 
support for abolition on evidence that the state’s capital punishment system 
is unfair, highly expensive to taxpayers, and does not serve as a deterrent to 
crime.190 Specifically, Yarbrough pointed out that despite the state’s $13 
billion budget shortfall, in ten years Illinois had spent more than $100 
million on the death penalty without executing anyone.191 Under 
Yarbrough’s bill, which was signed into law by Governor Pat Quinn on 
March 9, 2011, the money saved from the death penalty would go towards 
investigating unsolved cases and training law enforcement officials.192 
D. Cost and Abolition in Connecticut 
The cost of capital punishment was also a major part of the anti-death 
penalty movement in Connecticut,193 as well as an important factor in the 
state legislature’s decision to repeal its death penalty law in April 2012. 
Like New Mexico, Connecticut did not carry out an official cost study on 
the state’s death penalty system.194 When a bill to abolish the death penalty 
was introduced in the state legislature in 2009, however, the Connecticut 
General Assembly’s Office of Fiscal Analysis (OFA) estimated that the 
death penalty cost the state approximately $4 million each year.195 In 2012, 
the OFA estimated that the state would save $5 million each year by 
abolishing the death penalty.196 In the months leading up to the repeal, 
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several local newspapers reported on the high costs of the state’s death 
penalty system.197 One newspaper estimated that Connecticut spent between 
$100 million and $200 million on 240 capital cases since it reimplemented 
capital punishment in the wake of Furman.198 At the same time, the state 
only carried out one execution over three decades.199 
The Connecticut Network to Abolish the Death Penalty (CNADP), the 
ACLU, and the NAACP worked together to pressure legislators to vote for 
repeal. They argued that “[t]he death penalty does not work” and costs 
taxpayers far more than life in prison.200 The ACLU and others told state 
legislators that Connecticut’s death penalty took money from the state that 
could be used for other important state programs, such as education.201 
Support from prominent law enforcement officers bolstered the cost 
argument and convinced lawmakers that the death penalty was not an 
effective use of law enforcement resources.202 Moreover, the campaign had 
support from a large number of murder victims’ families who wrote letters 
and conducted interviews arguing that capital punishment was not only 
costly and inefficient, but also harmful to victims’ family members.203 
Many state legislators who ultimately voted for repeal were persuaded 
by the high costs of the death penalty, as well as evidence that there was 
little support for capital punishment among murder victims’ families.204 
Connecticut’s budget deficit grew from $500 million to $3.5 billion 
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between 2009 and 2012.205 Accordingly, state legislators knew that a “no” 
vote on the death penalty repeal bill would result in cuts to other state 
programs. When signing the state’s death penalty repeal bill, Governor 
Dannel P. Malloy cited the costly appeals process in capital cases as one of 
the reasons for his decision to support the legislation.206 
E. Cost and Abolition in Maryland 
In 2013, Maryland became the most recent state to abolish capital 
punishment. On March 15, 2013, the Maryland House of Delegates voted 
eighty-two to fifty-six to repeal the state’s death penalty law.207 Cost played 
a major role in Governor Martin O’Malley’s decision to file legislation to 
repeal Maryland’s death penalty statute in January 2013.208 Over the past 
four years, Governor O’Malley spoke out in favor of abolition on grounds 
that “there are better and cheaper ways to reduce crime.”209 A 2008 study 
found that Maryland spent $186 million more on capital cases over two 
decades than it would have spent if the state did not have the death 
penalty.210 At the same time, the state’s budget deficit grew from $432 
million to $1.6 billion between 2008 and 2011.211 
Similarly to other states, anti-death penalty advocates in Maryland 
focused on the high costs of the state’s death penalty system in a time of 
economic crisis. In addition, they argued that capital sentencing in 
Maryland is prone to racial bias and fails to deter crime.212 With support 
from anti-death penalty groups, Governor O’Malley called attention to the 
fact that despite the state’s death penalty system, Baltimore has become 
one of the most violent cities in the United States.213 The Governor 
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explained, “The death penalty is expensive and it does not work. And for 
that reason alone, I believe we should stop doing it.”214 
F. Cost in Other States 
Although most states still practice capital punishment, evidence shows 
that lawmakers in death penalty states are becoming more concerned about 
its costs. The cost and inefficiency argument has persuaded several state 
governments to conduct detailed examinations into the fiscal impact of 
their death penalty systems—an important first step towards perhaps 
inevitable repeal. For example, in Indiana, the Legislative Services Agency 
recently conducted a study on the costs of capital punishment in the state 
and found that the average capital case cost more than twice the amount of 
the average life-without-parole case.215 In July 2013, the Nevada legislature 
passed a bill authorizing an audit of the state’s death penalty, to be 
completed by January 2015.216 The Legislative Fiscal Analyst’s Office in 
Utah recently conducted a study on the costs of the state’s death penalty 
system, finding that the death penalty costs the state an additional $1.6 
million per inmate compared to life without parole.217 
In other states, lawmakers have specifically pointed to financial costs 
as a basis for their decisions to cosponsor death penalty repeal bills. In 
Kansas, for example, Senator Carolyn McGinn introduced a bill to abolish 
the death penalty in 2009, citing the state’s “dire deficit situation” and the 
need to look “outside the box to solve . . . budget problems.”218 In addition 
to pointing out that Kansas had not executed anyone since 1965, she argued 
that abolition of the death penalty could save Kansas over $500,000 per 
capital case.219 Former Colorado lawmaker Paul Weissman also introduced 
a bill to repeal the death penalty in 2009 to save money.220 The cost 
argument has also helped change the minds of conservatives221 and 
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lawmakers who had previously supported capital punishment. For instance, 
Montana Conservatives Concerned About the Death Penalty joined the 
anti-death penalty movement in Montana because of their belief that “[t]he 
death penalty is another institution of government that is wasteful and 
ineffective.”222 Representative Steve Handy, a Republican lawmaker from 
Utah, recently called for a fiscal review of state and local government costs 
of Utah’s death penalty system.223 Colorado’s President of the Senate, John 
Morse, stated in 2012 that he would likely support a bill to repeal the 
state’s death penalty statute, even though he had previously opposed efforts 
to repeal the state’s death penalty law.224 Considering Colorado has only 
executed one person since 1976, Morse recognizes that “[i]t costs a lot of 
money to keep the death penalty on the books.”225 
IV. COST, INTEREST-CONVERGENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
 ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT 
By focusing on the costs of capital punishment, the anti-death penalty 
movement has created an “interest-convergence” story. Advocacy 
organizations now spend fewer resources on convincing state lawmakers 
that abolishing the death penalty is morally right. Instead, anti-death 
penalty advocates ask state lawmakers to consider the opportunity costs of 
the death penalty.226 
The cost argument has created an interest-convergence story because 
anti-death penalty advocates are simply asking lawmakers to act in their 
own best interests, as well as the interests of their constituents. As states 
face substantial budget deficits, keeping the death penalty takes scarce 
resources away from other areas of law enforcement and other programs. 
The state legislatures mentioned in Part III, for example, all knew that 
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failing to repeal the death penalty would force them to cut spending on 
other programs. At the same time, state legislators are aware that 
executions are extremely rare and can take decades before they occur—if 
they occur at all.227 Although it may be difficult to put a price on justice, the 
increasingly known problem of wrongful convictions suggests that capital 
punishment as it exists today is far from just. Rather, advocates claim, it is 
unjust to require taxpayers to put millions of dollars into an inefficient 
death penalty system when the money could be better used for more 
valuable programs.228 Thus, the question is: considering the millions of 
dollars spent on an ineffective death penalty system, is the occasional 
execution worth the millions of dollars in taxpayer money? Many state 
lawmakers, as well as their residents, answer with a resounding “no.” 
The anti-death penalty movement’s recent focus on interest-
convergence contrasts sharply with its longstanding emphasis on morality 
discussed in Part II. In the past, many advocates endorsed the notion that 
capital punishment “is a human rights violation, not just a matter of 
criminal justice.”229 Today, anti-death penalty campaigns still focus on the 
injustice of the death penalty. In their state abolition campaigns, anti-death 
penalty coalitions have highlighted the problem of wrongful convictions 
and racial bias in the capital punishment system.230 They have also argued 
that the length of the death penalty process harms victims’ families. At the 
same time, more and more anti-death penalty organizations now cite cost to 
taxpayers as the number one reason, or at least a top reason, why the death 
penalty should be abolished.231 
The role of interest-convergence has potentially interesting 
implications for the future of the anti-death penalty movement. Namely, it 
suggests that advocacy groups should continue to focus more on practical 
issues, such as cost and inefficiency, in order to end capital punishment in 
the rest of the country. Several states, including Oregon and Washington, 
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appear to be on the verge of repealing their state death penalty statutes.232 
Moreover, most states’ economies have not yet recovered from the 2008 
financial crisis.233 Once state legislators and taxpayers no longer feel the 
pressure to balance state budgets in a time of financial crisis, the anti-death 
penalty movement’s cost argument may lose some of its persuasiveness. 
Thus, the window to push for nationwide death penalty reform may be 
closing quickly.234 
On the other hand, if the economic argument against the death penalty 
is so effective, why have some states repealed their death penalty statutes 
while others have not? On November 6, 2012, Californian voters rejected 
Proposition 34—a ballot initiative to abolish capital punishment in the 
state.235 Proposition 34 failed despite the presence of an anti-death penalty 
campaign that specifically focused on the high costs and inefficiency of the 
state’s death penalty system.236 Between 2008 and 2011, the ACLU 
published several reports that revealed the substantial costs of California’s 
death penalty.237 The state has only sentenced thirteen convicts to death 
since 1978, yet it has spent $4 billion on the death penalty since that 
time.238 The failure of Proposition 34 was particularly surprising because of 
California’s serious budget crisis,239 which one would think would have 
made the anti-death penalty movement’s cost argument particularly 
persuasive to voters in the state. 
At first blush, California’s failure to pass Proposition 34 appears to 
contradict this Note’s argument that interest-convergence can explain the 
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recent state trend towards abolition of the death penalty. There are several 
possible explanations, however, for the result in California. First and 
foremost, California’s attempt to abolish the death penalty through a ballot 
initiative (as opposed to a statute passed by the state legislature) may be a 
key factor in explaining its failure. With the exception of New York, every 
state that has abolished the death penalty over the past four decades has 
done so through the state legislature.240 California, however, is unique 
because its constitution requires a voter referendum to amend the state’s 
death penalty statutes.241 Although state legislators are supposed to 
represent the interests of their constituents, in reality it takes substantially 
fewer resources to educate legislators than to educate the millions of voters 
who must vote to change the law. It is particularly time-consuming to 
educate individuals about the costs of the death penalty because the idea 
that capital punishment costs more than life imprisonment does not 
intuitively resonate with most people.242 
Evidence suggests that Proposition 34 was unsuccessful because the 
anti-death penalty campaign failed to educate enough California voters 
about the high costs of the state’s capital punishment system. According to 
SAFE California, the organization that led the Proposition 34 campaign, a 
lack of funding prevented the campaign from getting the cost message out 
to voters.243 The campaign only raised $7.5 million, which it largely spent 
on 30-second TV advertisements about wrongful convictions. Although 
SAFE California highlighted the cost argument in its radio and Internet 
campaigns, TV advertisements are crucial to the success of California 
political campaigns.244 
Polls conducted in California within the past two years confirm SAFE 
California’s belief that many California voters were unaware of the high 
costs of the state’s death penalty system when they voted against 
Proposition 34. A poll conducted by University of California, Berkeley, 
and the Field Poll shortly before Election Day showed that 42% of 
California voters were in favor of Proposition 34, while 45% opposed the 
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measure.245 However, the poll did not inform respondents about the cost 
savings that would result from the initiative.246 In fact, in a 2011 California 
Field Poll, the majority of respondents stated that they believed the death 
penalty was cheaper than life in prison without parole (43% to 41%).247 In 
contrast, a poll conducted by David Binder Research in 2011 shows that 
when California voters were informed about the costs, the number of 
California voters in support of the death penalty dropped dramatically.248 
Specifically, the poll found that 63% of California voters favored life in 
prison without parole over the death penalty when they were told that it 
would save the state $1 billion in five years and the money saved would go 
towards law enforcement and public education.249 
Regardless, the failure of Proposition 34 should not be viewed as 
signaling a failure of the cost argument or the anti-death penalty movement 
in general. The number of Californians who voted for Proposition 34—
48%—was a milestone for California’s anti-death penalty movement.250 
Over the past several decades, polls indicated that an overwhelming 
number of California voters supported capital punishment, and California 
lawmakers generally believed that voicing disapproval of the death penalty 
was a “high risk-venture” for their political careers.251 Now, after 
Proposition 34 confirmed that public support for capital punishment is 
declining, elected officials in California may be more willing to support 
repealing the death penalty. 
It is also important to note that the unique history of the death penalty 
in each state may influence whether the cost argument is effective in 
achieving repeal legislation. For instance, while New Jersey, Connecticut, 
and New Mexico had not executed anyone in the decades preceding the 
abolition of the death penalty in their respective states, other states, namely 
Texas and Alabama, continue to execute people every year.252 Residents of 
Texas and Alabama may therefore see more value in the death penalty than 
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residents of other states, and it may be more difficult to convince them that 
capital punishment is a waste of taxpayer dollars. In addition, the fact that 
some states are more cash-strapped than others also may account for the 
varying success of the cost argument. For instance, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Illinois, and Connecticut all faced extremely high budget deficits 
when their legislatures voted to abolish the death penalty.253 
It is also possible that some state lawmakers are opposed to 
considering cost as part of the death penalty debate. Some lawmakers have 
argued that the decision of whether to administer the death penalty is 
strictly a moral—and not economic—issue.254 On an abstract level, this 
argument has merit: the cost argument would be inappropriate in the 
context of a flawless death penalty system where states have abundant 
resources. The country’s capital sentencing process, however, is fraught 
with errors. In addition, there is no penological reason why capital 
punishment is more effective than life without parole.255 Lastly, the death 
penalty deprives states of other important crime-control programs because 
it demands so much money. For these reasons, policymakers must consider 
the costs of the death penalty to fulfill their duties to the people of their 
state.256 
Evidence shows that the cost argument is working in many states, in 
spite of a few roadblocks. Accordingly, anti-death penalty advocates should 
continue to create an interest-convergence story by focusing on the high 
costs of capital punishment. Combined with evidence of wrongful 
convictions, the cost argument shows that the abolition of the death penalty 
is in the states’ best fiscal interests. At the same time, anti-death penalty 
advocates should not completely ignore the moral quandaries involved in 
the death penalty. Instead, they should continue to argue that the money 
spent on the death penalty should go towards victim assistance and other 
critical law enforcement needs. Lastly, the anti-death penalty movement 
should continue to educate the public about the inefficiencies and costs of 
capital punishment. Considering state lawmakers’ strong interest in 
winning reelection, they will only vote to repeal the death penalty if they 
think their constituents support such legislation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In his concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees, Justice Stevens opined, 
“The time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of the enormous costs 
that death penalty litigation imposes on society with the benefits that it 
produces has surely arrived.”257 Fortunately for Justice Stevens, a focus on 
the costs of the death penalty has arrived because the anti-death penalty 
movement helped bring the issue to the public’s attention. By creating an 
interest-convergence story, anti-death penalty advocates have finally turned 
the tide in the movement towards ending the death penalty in the United 
States. By emphasizing the costs and inefficiencies of capital punishment, 
advocates have helped convince state lawmakers that ending the death 
penalty is in the states’ best interests, especially considering the recent 
economic crisis. Although the cost argument has not been a “magic bullet” 
for ending the death penalty in America, it has proven more successful than 
any of the moral arguments that the anti-death penalty movement has used 
in the past. This interest-convergence story has implications for the future 
of the anti-death penalty movement because it suggests that anti-death 
penalty advocates should continue to focus their strategy on an economic-
based approach, at least while states’ budget woes persist. It also has 
implications for social movements in general. Activists generally attempt to 
create social change by concentrating on the moral and humanitarian need 
for reform. The anti-death penalty movement’s recent success, however, 
suggests that appealing to policymakers’ own interests may prove a more 
fruitful strategy in the end. 
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